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Is the Doha Round worth the efforts currently devoted to it? Many people—and in particular 
many industrialists in Europe and the United States—are not convinced. Recent estimates of 
the gains from what is on the table at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva are 
fueling these doubts. Indeed, such small gains should hardly come as a big surprise after two 
decades of industrial tariff cuts by the largest (developed and emerging) world economies. For 
instance, the average applied tariff of the 34 countries that account for 95 percent of world 
trade and GDP is roughly 7 percent in the manufacturing sector (see table 1, column 6).2 No 
wonder that cuts in already low tariff levels do not result in large welfare gains.  “Death by 
Success” would seem an appropriate epitaph for the WTO in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Such a conclusion would be terribly wrong. First, it ignores the situation in agriculture and in 
services. These two sectors are highly protected and together they represent 75 percent of the 
GDP of rich and poor countries alike (although in very different proportions). Potential gains 
from liberalization in these sectors are huge—and industrialists will be among the chief 
beneficiaries, particularly as consumers of services. 
 
Second, and of much more direct concern to the industrialists, such a conclusion relies on a 
deeply misplaced perception of the real situation facing the industrial sector itself.  
Industrialists take for granted the current state of liberalization in manufacturing. It is time for 
them to wake up and realize, before it is too late, that the current world trade regime in 
manufacturing is a funabulist walking a tightrope above an abyss. To reach this conclusion 
                                               
1
 Professor of Economics and Director of the Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po in Paris: 
http://gem.sciences-po.fr. I would like to thank Mark Allegrini, William Colwell, Joe Guinan, Jennifer Hillman, 
Nicola Lightner, and Courtney Phillips-Youman for their decisive help in writing this note. All errors are mine 
alone. 
2
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one need only look to the real gold mine in the Doha negotiations on industrial products: in 
the present case, gold means “certainty.” 
 
The World as it is – Really 
 
Today, all the largest economies apply mostly moderate or low tariffs in manufacturing. But 
most of them have never made the commitment that they will keep these tariffs at their 
current levels. For instance, exporters of industrial products to Singapore face an average zero 
tariff, but Singapore could increase this tariff to 6.3 percent at any time and without providing 
compensation to its WTO trading partners. Examples abound: average tariffs could surge—
again, at any time and with no penalty—from 3.6 to 11 percent in Australia, from 6.6 to 10.2 
per cent in Korea, from 6.7 to 35.6 per cent in Indonesia, from 12.5 to 30.8 percent in Brazil, 
or from 11.5 to 36.2 percent in India (see table 1, columns 5 and 6). To keep things simple, all 
these examples are expressed in terms of average tariffs over all industrial products. But 
increases are likely to be higher for those tariffs that remain high—up to 300 percent!—and 
hence much more devastating for concerned foreign exporters and domestic consumers. 
 
Are such dramatic reversals possible? WTO negotiators (and before them GATT negotiators) 
conclude agreements in terms of “bound” tariffs. WTO Members can apply tariffs that are 
lower than the agreed bound tariffs, but the bound tariffs are the only ones that, according to 
WTO rules, an importing country cannot raise without compensating its affected trading 
partners. As a result, they are the only ones that deliver the kind of legal certainty that 
business people cherish so much. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the magnitude of the problem. Out of the 34 largest economies, only eight 
impose their applied tariffs at their bound levels. These eight  (Canada, China, the European 
Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Taiwan, and the United States) are the only “certain” 
WTO Members—all the others are potential defaulters.3 
 
The fact that these eight economies represent between two-thirds and three-quarters of world 
GDP (depending upon the exchange-rate used) may seem reassuring. It is not. The “Quad” 
countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States) accounted for roughly 
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the same share of world GDP in 1980 (using PPP-based exchange rates) or in 1990 (using 
current exchange rates). In short, China and Taiwan have compensated for the declining 
weight of the “Quad” countries’ share of world GDP in a rapidly globalizing world. But this 
does not mean that China and Taiwan are stabilizing the level of certainty of the world trade 
regime at its 1980 or 1990 level. The high growth of China and Taiwan is both recent and 
deeply intertwined—and hence very fragile. That will make it hard for these economies to 
produce the same level of certainty as the other “certain” WTO Members—assuming that 
such a level is remaining constant. If—when?—crisis strikes in China, nobody really knows 
what will happen, all the more because China’s political stability is largely based on the 
government’s capacity to deliver high growth and not just any growth. 
 
The 26 other largest economies, whose tariffs are applied at rates below their tariff bindings, 
are also a source of severe systemic risk.  Roughly half a dozen of them could be seen as 
generating moderate risk since their bound tariffs are merely 4 to 8 percent higher than the 
corresponding applied tariffs. But these small numbers are deceptive: they conceal huge trade 
flows that are crucial to our modern economies dominated by goods assembled from many 
components produced in many countries—with many border-crossings that make even low 
tariffs costly. The remaining countries individually represent smaller trade flows. But together 
they make up a substantial part of world trade in industrial goods (roughly 18 percent), exhibit 
an annual growth rate twice that of the Quad’s, and the risks involved are much larger: their 
bound industrial tariffs are often 20 to 40 percent higher than their applied tariffs. 
 
The benefits of binding in the Doha Round stem from the elimination of the possibility that 
the emerging economies—40 percent of the GDP of the rich countries—could increase their 
tariffs on average by 3.5 times (from roughly 8 to 28 percent for industrial goods, and from 
roughly 19 to 66 percent for agricultural products) at any time and without providing 
compensation to their WTO trading partners. 
 
Why would it be different today? 
 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the world trading system collapsed precisely because it 
could not deliver enough “certainty”—indeed, the notion of bound tariffs was created by 
witnesses to this collapse. However, many may argue that looking at such a distant past is 
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irrelevant, dismissing the fact that, in the late 1920s, the world trade regime was 65 years 
old—roughly the same age as ours!4 Would it really be any “different” today? 
 
Two recent cases shed some disturbing light. In the early 2000s, Turkey was in the midst of a 
severe economic crisis, raising the prospect of tariff increases as a source of much-needed 
additional public revenue.  However, ultimately Turkey did not raise tariffs because the 
country had entered into a customs union agreement with the European Union in 1995, 
agreeing to apply the EU tariff policy, including EU tariff bindings. Should Turkey thus be 
considered a “certain” WTO Member by proxy? Not until it becomes an EU Member State—
and this is a much-debated possibility.5 
 
The second case illustrates a much more common—and worrisome—situation. In the mid-
1990s, Mexico was hit by one of the worst economic crises it has endured, very soon after the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and 
Canada.  Once again, this raised the prospect of tariff increases. Mexico decided not to raise 
its tariffs on imports from Canada and the United States, but to do so on more than 500 goods 
imported from the rest of the world. In case of a world economic crisis (a slump in the United 
States or European Union combined with a severe slowdown in China) such a “beggar-most-
of-my-neighbors” possibility—exporting uncertainty to most trading partners, while 
abolishing it for very few others at the price of higher trade distortions domestically—would 
be a sure recipe for the world-wide and bitter collapse of the global trading system.  The 
recent ban on food exports by 28 countries is ample evidence that a crisis atmosphere pushes 
governments to take politically expedient but economically unsound actions. 
 
The Doha Package:  The Pacificateur 
 
If adopted, the Doha Round package currently under discussion in Geneva would hugely 
improve certainty. In the industrial sector, the emerging economies would cut their average 
bound tariffs to roughly 13-15 percent, with very few tariffs remaining above 20 percent. For 
almost half of these products, the post-Doha bound tariffs would be lower than the currently 
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applied tariffs.  Because this is the only source of the current estimates of the welfare gains 
from the Doha negotiations on industrial goods, the estimates reflect only a small part of the 
overall gains to be had.  For the other half, the applied tariffs would remain the same. But the 
bound tariffs would be cut by a huge amount, 15-18 percentage points on average—roughly 5 
times the average cuts in applied tariffs. Such cuts would reduce current transaction costs, 
generating the “commercial opportunities” that negotiators are asking for and that are not 
exploited because of fear of sudden changes in countries’ tariffs. They would deliver the 
certainty so much desired by the industrialists—and with it, the huge welfare gains that are 
ignored by current estimates of the benefits of the Doha Round.6 
 
The Doha Round negotiations in agriculture will have an even stronger “pacifying” impact 
because the uncertainty is much worse in “agriculture” than in manufacturing (see table 1, 
columns 9 to 11). Contrary to a widely-held belief, the agriculture negotiations concern 
processed food products in addition to farm commodities. Moreover, not only would the Doha 
package in agriculture bind these tariffs at a more moderate level, but it would also bind 
export subsidies at a very low level and domestic subsidies in agriculture at a level relatively 
similar to the tariff bindings. Of course, there is the risk of overly-generous “exceptions” to 
these moves toward liberalization. But clearly, the stronger the support for the Doha Round 
from the business community, the sounder the exceptions will turn out to be. 
 
Taken together, all these results are very close to what European, U.S., and world businesses 
have been repeatedly asking for since the early 2000s. Without critical support from the 
business community, there is a serious risk that trade negotiators will lose control of the WTO 
talks, with the catastrophic consequences underlined above. Talleyrand, a famous French 
negotiator, kept saying to an ever more demanding Napoleon “Votre Majesté, surtout point 
trop de zèle” (“Your Majesty, not too much zeal”). Napoleon ignored Talleyrand’s advice. He 
ended up at Waterloo. 
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Total
WTO billions billions Real imports average imports average imports
Members US$ US$ growth billions $ bound applied tariff billions $ bound applied tariff billions $
[a] [b] [c] [a] tariff (%) tariff (%) water [d] [a] tariff (%) tariff (%) water [d] [a]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
The 8 largest "true" WTO Members
EU27 [e] 14554 12634 2.1 1697 3.9 3.8 0.1 1016 15.1 15.0 0.1 124
United States 13202 13202 2.7 1918 3.3 3.2 0.1 1348 5.0 5.5 -0.5 104
Japan 4340 4131 1.6 580 2.4 2.6 -0,2 297 22.7 22.3 0.4 65
China 2668 10048 9.8 791 9.1 9.1 0.0 579 15.8 15.8 0.0 51
Canada 1251 1140 2.5 358 5.3 3.7 1.6 280 14.5 17.9 -3.4 24
Taiwan 365 n.a. 2.8 203 4.8 4.6 0.2 138 18.4 17.5 0.9 10
Hong Kong 190 267 4.7 336 0.0 0.0 0.0 305 0.0 0.0 0.0 12
Macao 14 20 12.9 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1
All the 8 [f] [f] [f] [f] [f]
Members 78.1 66.8 2.9 67.1 4.1 3.9 0.3 67.1 13.1 13.4 -0.4 62.7
The next 26 largest WTO Members
Brazil 1068 1708 2,9 96 30.8 12.5 18.3 66 35.5 10.3 25.2 6
India 906 4247 7.3 175 36.2 11.5 24.7 85 114.2 34.4 79.8 7
Korea 888 1152 4.6 309 10.2 6.6 3.6 178 59.3 49.0 10.3 19
Mexico 839 1202 2.2 268 34.9 11.2 23.7 222 44.1 22.1 22.0 19
Australia 768 728 3.1 139 11.0 3.8 7.2 106 3.3 1.3 2.0 8
Turkey 403 662 4.6 140 16.9 4.8 12.1 93 60.1 46.7 13.4 8
Indonesia 364 921 4.9 80 35.6 6.7 28.9 53 47.0 8.6 38.4 7
Norway 311 202 2.2 64 3.1 0.6 2.5 50 135.8 57.8 78.0 5
Saudi Arabia 310 384 3.4 70 10.5 4.7 5.8 56 20.0 7.6 12.4 9
South Africa 255 567 4.1 77 15.7 7.6 8.1 55 40.8 9.2 31.6 4
Argentina 214 618 3.1 34 31.8 12.3 19.5 30 32.6 10.2 22.6 1
Thailand 206 604 5.0 131 25.5 8.2 17.3 87 40.2 22.1 18.1 7
Venezuela 182 203 3.8 34 33.6 12.7 20.9 29 55.8 16.4 39.4 4
Malaysia 149 301 4.7 131 14.9 7.9 7.0 101 76.0 11.7 64.3 9
Chile 146 208 4.2 38 25.0 6.0 19.0 23 26.0 6.0 20.0 3
Colombia 136 363 3.9 26 35.4 11.8 23.6 22 91.9 16.6 75.3 3
Singapore 132 144 4.6 239 6.3 0.0 6.3 175 36.5 0.1 36.4 7
Pakistan 129 406 5.1 30 54.6 13.8 40.8 17 95.6 15.8 79.8 4
Israel 123 179 1.6 50 11.5 5.0 6.5 36 73.3 19.7 53.6 4
Philippines 117 463 4.6 54 23.4 5.8 17.6 40 34.6 9.6 25.0 4
Nigeria 115 169 5.5 22 48.5 11.4 37.1 18 150.0 15.6 134.4 3
Egypt 107 352 4.2 21 27.7 9.2 18.5 10 96.1 66.4 29.7 5
NewZealand 104 110 3.2 26 10.6 3.2 7.4 19 5.7 1.7 4.0 2
Peru 93 188 4.7 15 30.0 9.7 20.3 10 30.8 13.6 17.2 2
Kuwait 81 67 5.5 16 100.0 4.7 95.3 13 100.0 4.0 96.0 2
Bangladesh 62 320 5.6 16 34.4 14.2 20.2 10 192.0 16.9 175.1 3
All the 26 [f] [f] [f] [f] [f]
Members 17.5 26.5 4.1 26.2 27.6 7.9 19.7 27.1 65.8 19.0 46.8 24.8
Other Members [f] [f] [f] [f] [f]
2.0 3.5 3.8 4.5 34.3 9.9 24.4 4.3 62.3 17.0 45.2 8.0
Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Profiles, WTO website (http://www.wto.org), April 2008. Author's computations.
Notes: [a] in billions of US$ at current exchange rates (countries are classified by declining GDP at current exchange rates).
[b] in billions of US$ at purchasing-power-parity exchange rates.
[c] annual growth rate of the real GDP observed for the 2000-2006 period.
[d] the "tariff water" (in percentage) is the difference between the average bound tariff and the average applied tariff.
[e] EU27 is counted as one WTO Member.
[f] in percent of the world total.
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Table 1. The urgent need for consolidating the world trade regime
Gross Domestic Product Agriculture
simple average simple average
 
 
 
WTO
Members bound applied bound applied bound applied
bound applied bound applied bound applied
The 8 largest 3.6 3.4 11.4 11.8 3.9 3.8 12.3 12.5 4.8 4.7 12.7 12.9
The 26 largest 21.5 7.1 60.2 22.8 24.9 8.3 57.0 22.1 28.4 9.4 68.9 23.6
Other Members 26.5 9.6 49.7 19.8 30.1 9.7 51.0 20.0 30.4 11.2 52.0 21,8
Source: see Table 1.
GDP(PPP)-weighted tariff averages
industry agriculture industry agriculture industry agriculture
Import-weighted tariff averages current GDP-weighted tariff averages
Table 2.  Additional estimates of tariff averages (%)
 
 
